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In 1997 Peter Schuck proposed a ‘refugee quota trading’ mechanism, whereby countries voluntarily form a 
union, each country accepting a quota of refugees and able to buy and sell the quota to other states within and 
even outside of the union. Today, the EU arguably has a de facto cash transfer mechanism both within the EU 
and between the EU and European Neighbourhood Policy countries. This article explores the question of 
refugee quota trading, explaining why current EU policy fails to increase refugee protection. Throughout the 
critique, states are treated either as rational actors or actors with present-preference bias, the latter largely 
ignored in current discussions on international refugee ‘burden sharing’. In addition, the ethics of refugee quota 
trading is presented using arguments distinct from that of Anker et al. (1998) who argue that refugee quota 
trading creates a ‘commodification’ of refugees. One could argue that refugees’ protection is being 
commodified, not refugees themselves. However, when states are provided funds not to deport refugees, this can 
be a type of reward for not taking an action that states ought to follow regardless of the reward. Just as there are 
non-utilitarian reasons not to rely on rewards alone for lowering the crime rates for heinous crimes within states, 
there may be non-utilitarian arguments against refugee quota trading. 
Refugees, asylum-seekers, burden sharing, European Neighborhood Policy 
 
 
 
The 1951 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol give 
refugees the right to gain asylum in the first country in which they arrive. Yet, within the 
European Union (EU), some states receive significantly more ‘spontaneous refugees’ 
compared to others. Most EU countries accept significantly fewer refugees per capita, 
and certainly fewer per GDP, compared to European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) countries 
(UNHCR 2009). Solutions proposed in the current academic literature include 
mechanisms for ‘burden sharing’, to ensure a more equal distribution of obligations 
towards refugee protection. In relation to this, the provision of quotas for each country is 
proposed, each country also given the ability to trade these quotas amongst themselves 
(Schuck 1997). A similar policy involves money transfers in return for asylum without 
any set quotas (Hathaway and Neve 1997). These mechanisms have already been the 
subject of analysis by Anker et al. (1998) and Smith (2004) and others (Czaika 2009: 
103 and Facchini et al. 2006) have shown the practical weaknesses of a money transfer 
scheme between rational states. This paper returns to this debate within the context of 
the EU itself and its relationships with ENP countries. It also (see Anker et al. 1998) 
tackles the questions of the practical results of quota trading and the ethical limits of the 
quota trading proposal but uses fresh theoretical critiques and applies the issue 
specifically to EU-ENP relations. It answers the question: Do refugee quotas and quota 
sharing within the EU and between the EU and ENP countries constitute a viable and 
ethical policy? 
The article also engages with key wider debates concerning the relationship between the 
normative and cost-benefit logic of states attempting to take part in burden sharing for 
refugee protection. It first provides insight into why rational states may not be 
incentivised to absorb refugees as part of a voluntary quota trading scheme. Unlike 
previous critiques (Czaika 2009; Facchini et al. 2006; Smith 2004; and Anker et al. 
1998), the article compares and contrasts refugee quota trading to catastrophic health 
insurance in the private and public sector, the analogy used by Schuck (1997). The 
comparison helps clarify why refugee quota sharing may fail in an international arena. 
This comparison with insurance is necessary, considering the term ‘insurance’ has 
increasingly been used to explain why states agree to burden sharing mechanisms. This 
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article then goes beyond the logic of both rational choice and norms to show how a ‘bias 
towards the present’ (Parfit 2011) or ‘status quo bias’ (Kahneman et al. 1991) may 
diminish the effectiveness of quota trading on a theoretical level. The bias towards the 
present may also serve as an additional logic for the actions of states, rather than only a 
combination of normative and rational cost-benefit logic as addressed by Thielemann in 
the context of the EU (2003a). Finally, building on literature that questions the ethics of 
refugee quota trading (Smith 2004; and Anker et al. 1998), the article questions an 
approach that only addresses the ‘provision of asylum capacities’ (Czaika 2009: 91) or 
the ‘utilitarian social welfare’ (Facchini et al. 2006: 418) of burden sharing mechanisms. 
Unlike previous literature, I show why refugee quota trading might be considered 
unethical even if it succeeds in protecting refugees. 
Before this contribution, the following second section will provide broader context, 
including an overview of policies within the EU and ENP countries with regards to asylum 
coordination, and a brief overview of the current literature on burden-sharing. The 
solution of refugee quota trading is then critiqued in the third section of the article, using 
four major categories of argumentation, each using a slightly different qualitative 
methodology. The first and second categories, which build on the assumptions of Schuck 
(1997), assess the potential impact of refugee quota trading for EU and ENP states, with 
states assumed to be rational actors. The methodology also partially draws on the 
analytical framework developed by Noll (2003) who demonstrates the value of using a 
game-theoretic approach to understanding why cooperation may fail. The third category 
of argumentation uses a bounded rational choice assumption, attempting to explore the 
potential limits of refugee quota trading if states have a status quo bias. This 
methodology differs from Noll (2003), Thielemann (2003a) and others who limit their 
analysis to the tangible and intangible costs and benefits and coordination challenges in 
refugee burden sharing, rather than biases even under a completely coordinated system 
with tangible costs. However, the bias towards the present could be interpreted as an 
intangible cost, and therefore be a new factor to consider within the theoretical 
framework developed by Noll (2003) and Thielemann (2003a). In this section the 
theoretical examples use a two-country model, extending the Facchini et al. (2006) 
quantitative model by making qualitative suggestions that can be applied to a 
quantitative analysis. 
The fourth argument in this section relates more closely to the study of ethics, and 
questions whether the morality of refugee quota trading conflicts with our intuitions 
about moral responsibility. This fourth critique will include an imaginary thought 
experiment of a policy that would be considered morally wrong, yet which is similar 
enough to refugee quota trading to raise moral concerns about that policy. This is a 
similar method to Smith (2004), who compares quota trading to another policy 
considered immoral. Like Smith, the methodology does not include a full philosophical 
analysis, though it presents a starting point for such analysis by showing the intuitive 
limits of an approach that only attempts to maximise welfare utility. 
 
THE ASYLUM DEBATE 
Attempts at a coordinated asylum policy in the EU and with ENP countries 
A brief overview of the evolution of cooperation within the EU and between EU and ENP 
countries is necessary first in order to understand better why money transfers have 
become relevant in refugee absorption and in the academic literature on refugee burden 
sharing. International law, though not always followed, sets the general standards for 
asylum processing within the EU. The 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol are the 
main pieces of international law, along with the UNHCR’s (United Nations Refugee 
Agency) non-legally binding ExCom Conclusions. In the 1951 Convention and 
subsequent UNHCR guidelines, which have been incorporated into domestic law in EU 
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countries, an individual has the right to asylum if he or she can prove his or her life is 
under threat in the country they fled from, because of persecution due to their ethnicity, 
national origin, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. However, 
different countries offer different levels of assistance to refugees, and have different 
criteria for proof of refugee status. This in itself can make cooperation on refugee 
absorption a challenge, even if states agree to accept more refugees, which they often 
do not. 
In the 1980s, the Council of Europe agreed that it was necessary to harmonise asylum 
law to prevent ‘country shopping,’ whereby asylum-seekers do not request asylum at the 
first country they reach, leading to the Dublin Convention in 1990 (European Union 
1997), which determined the state responsible for examining an application for asylum. 
Similarly, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, immigration law, including asylum 
law, was considered a common interest of EU countries. As a result, there were limited 
attempts to coordinate and create more equal burden sharing, and this included 
responsibilities towards refugees who had fled first countries of asylum outside of the 
EU. A press release from Brussels in September 2009 emphasises that the number of 
refugees voluntarily resettled in any member country is lower than those resettled in the 
US, Canada, and Australia, but that far more spontaneous asylum cases reach the EU 
compared to these countries (European Commission 2009). Many of these refugees 
arrive from third countries that may not follow the principle of non-refoulement. 
Coordination between EU countries therefore involves engaging with third countries. The 
original readmission responsibilities of the EU were described in Article 63(3)(b) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty as including ‘repatriation of illegal immigrants’ (Official Journal C 340 
1997). However, if third countries are not processing asylum-seekers, and perhaps 
deporting them, these particular people have the right under the Convention to seek 
asylum. Protected Entry Procedures were suggested in the November 2000 
Communication. This entails asylum-seekers getting refugee status recognition outside 
of the EU and then applying for resettlement in EU member states (Noll et al. 2002). The 
Commission recommended that this particular procedure be complementary and not at 
the expense of asylum-seekers who reach EU member states without prior refugee 
status recognition. However, such protection may come at the expense of spontaneous 
asylum-seekers. For example, in the case of Denmark’s mechanism of requiring visas for 
Bosnians, and for allowing a limited quota of ‘particularly distressed’ Bosnians, such 
protection came after access to Danish territory had already been blocked to most 
Bosnians (ibid). This mechanism within the EU therefore relies on improvement of 
asylum mechanisms within third countries, though these are not always available. 
Bosnians, for example, needed to cross the border into Croatia to reach a Danish 
representative or a UNHCR representative (ibid). Therefore, in 2005 a communication on 
Regional Protection Programmes (RPP) set out the need to improve asylum processes 
and conditions in non-EU countries, perhaps in order to prevent refugees from reaching 
the EU. RPP was to consist of practical actions that aimed to ‘deliver real benefits both in 
terms of protection offered to refugees and in their support of existing arrangements 
with the relevant third country.’ (COM [2005] 388). ‘Real benefits’ included cash 
transfers as a mechanism for refugee protection in third countries. 
 
Funds for asylum processing and refugee absorption 
The ‘European Union Policy towards a Common European Asylum System’ created a EUR 
250 million budget in the AENEAS Programme between 2004 and 2008 to be given to 
those third countries which needed assistance in asylum processing (COM [2006] 26). 
Within the EU, member states can voluntarily agree to accept refugees who have already 
received refugee status from the UNHCR, and these member states will receive EUR 
4,000 for every refugee they accept from the European Refugee Fund, the budget of 
which was EUR 614 for the period between 2008 and 2013 (European Parliament and 
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Council 2007). Funds provided through the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) are given in the case of some readmission agreements, with the purposes of 
improving asylum processes. According to the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Vasyl Marmazov, one temporary centre for illegal migration located in Volyn, 
Ukraine cost UAH 36 million (USD 4,497,335) with funds received directly from the EU 
and through the IOM (in Klymonchuk 2009). The total budget for the IOM is close to CHF 
40 million (USD 75 million), though the total budget for all country field missions for the 
2010 year was CHF 3,673,000 (IOM 2009). 
Funds for EU countries are often not enough to encourage voluntary acceptance of 
asylum-seekers, suggesting funds in exchange for re-admittance of stateless persons 
may not be the most effective incentive for a fair asylum process, both in terms of the 
incentive of countries to pay other countries and the incentive the payment creates to 
accept refugees. For instance, Guild points out that only Romania, a non-EU country at 
the time, agreed to accept Uzbek refugees fleeing from Kyrgyzstan in 2005, even though 
EU states would have received funding from the European Refugee Fund (ERP) and 
Romania could not (Guild 2006: 631).  
There are mixed results in the extent to which funding from the EU to third countries 
leads to readmission agreements. The 2007 EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council established 
EU financial support for asylum processes and infrastructure needs in addition to easier 
visa access for Ukrainian citizens, in return for Ukraine re-admitting stateless persons 
who had left Ukraine for EU counties. Wichmann uses this as an example of a 
mechanism used in the ENP to improve judicial procedures in non-EU countries. 
However, she also points to the failed negotiations with Morocco, an ENP country which 
requested and was denied funding for processing immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Wichmann 2007: 14). Because Spain solicited Morocco for a readmission agreement, 
but could not pay the costs of assuring that immigrants from Sub-Saharan African would 
be repatriated to their country of origin after readmission to Morocco, the agreement 
was never fully implemented (Cassarino 2009). 
Furthermore, even if funds are provided to absorb those who are readmitted to non-EU 
countries, these refugees may also be forcibly repatriated to areas of conflict. The ENP 
progress report on Israel, for example, states that ‘Israel, in coordination with Egypt, 
continues to instantly and forcibly send back asylum-seekers/migrants from countries 
such as Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia’ (European Commission 2009a). Even when states 
accept refugees and therefore receive funding to assist them, the funds are not 
necessarily utilised for this purpose. The UNHCR funds to UNHCR offices in Egypt for 
processing asylum seekers were arguably/apparently misused when refugees had 
difficulty accessing UNHCR offices, and could therefore not receive funds meant to be 
allocated for the welfare of refugees (Moorhead 2005). Furthermore, legal aid assists in 
gaining refugee status in Cairo, but those without such aid have extreme difficulties 
(Kagan 2006). 
Financial transfers therefore play a role, positive or otherwise, in the relations between 
EU and ENP countries. States view accepting refugees as a burden, and this can inhibit 
states from absorbing them, making refugees vulnerable to deportations. Money 
transfers can be used for a variety of purposes, including as incentive to absorb 
refugees, as a means to cover costs of absorption, and as a means to deport refugees 
from an ENP country to the country of origin or another country of asylum. A type of 
explicit trading is therefore increasingly playing a role in the refugee regime, both in 
terms of bilateral agreements and as a result of attempts at burden sharing. 
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Burden sharing and refugee quota trading in the current literature 
While it is clear that cash transfers play some role in refugee policy, current scholarly 
work has attempted to understand better the patterns of burden sharing within the EU 
and proposals for coordination that improve welfare and better protect refugees. One 
debate within this literature is why states agree to take part in burden sharing, such as 
contributing to the European Refugee Fund, when they would appear to be worse off in 
such a scheme. Thielemann argues that one reason may be because they are committed 
to certain norms, such as human rights protection. Another reason is that the scheme 
can be in their interests if they are receiving side-payments for agreeing to the scheme. 
The scheme can also serve as insurance for the future (Thielemann 2003b: 228) because 
states know that, should a large number of refugees enter their country in the future, 
other states will assist in absorption. Empirical evidence shows that states act according 
to both a cost-benefit logic and a norm logic, taking actions that are deemed 
‘appropriate’, without necessarily calculating the costs and benefits (Thielemann 
(2003a). 
Another related debate is whether refugee protection is a ‘public good’. Suhrke (1999) 
argues that refugees staying in their home countries can fuel conflict, destabilising 
security for all. Refugee protection, like a public good, creates non-excludable benefits 
for states – meaning no state can be excluded from the benefits, in general, of the 
refugee protection regime - and non-rival benefits – meaning one state benefiting from 
refugee protection does not diminish the benefits to others. This is because all states 
benefit as a result of increased security from refugee protection, tempting states to free-
ride off the generosity of other states providing this protection (Suhrke 1999). If refugee 
protection is a public good, a voluntary insurance scheme may not work because of free-
riding. Yet there are benefits that only accrue to a state that contributes to the burden-
sharing regime, suggesting that there are instances in which states can be incentivised 
to contribute (Betts 2003). Refugee protection, Betts argues, may not be a public good 
model but a ‘joint-product model’ where there is a positive relationship between a state’s 
contributions to the regime and the excludable benefits it gains from the regime. In 
other words, the benefits that it gains means that others, as a result of not contributing, 
will not gain. This would suggest that states have an interest in not always free-riding. 
For example, resettlement agreements with other countries, should a state be faced with 
far more refugees than it feels it can absorb, are perhaps dependent on having absorbed 
at least a given minimum number of refugees. 
If states, for whatever reason, do contribute to the regime – either despite the fact that 
it is a public good or because they have an interest in contributing because it is a joint 
product model – this could allow for what Thielemann (2008: 13) calls ‘trading in 
refugee protection contributions’. A ‘multi-dimensional burden sharing regime’ 
(Thielemann (2008: 13) can exist, for example, when one state focuses on peacekeeping 
to prevent refugees from needing to flee and another state focuses on asylum. In a 
sense, the first country is contributing less by absorbing fewer refugees in return for 
contributing more through peacekeeping. Using the same logic, money transfers to 
countries in return for them absorbing more refugees could be one type of ‘multi-
dimensional burden sharing regime’. Hathaway and Neve propose one type of money 
transfer scheme, a solution they call ‘responsibility sharing allocations’ (1997:203). 
Opposing quotas according to GNP (Grahl-Madsen 1982), Hathaway and Neve support 
temporary settlement in areas according to geographical and cultural proximity of the 
country refugees are fleeing. To ‘offset inequitably assigned costs’ they propose also that 
‘fiscal burden sharing will be guaranteed’ which would include money transfers from 
Northern states to Southern states (1997:204). 
Others have tested money-transfer mechanisms through theoretical models. Facchini et 
al. (2006) build a two country model to show that the possibility of cross-country 
financial transfers may increase strategic responses in democratic countries, leading to 
sub-optimal outcomes from the perspective of utilitarian social welfare. In addition, 
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2013) jcer.net Mollie Gerver 
 66 
countries where refugee absorption involves a high cost, or where other countries’ 
absorption of refugees involves very few spill-over gains, may choose to take a unilateral 
policy approach (Czaika 2009: 103) as there is little incentive to pay another country to 
absorb more refugees. 
Schuck, like Hathaway and Neve, supports money transfers to countries that have a 
greater number of refugees, but he does not recommend that refugees receive 
protection in any particular country. He proposes creating a union where states can 
voluntary join to accept a proportional quota of refugees (Schuck 1997: 246). States can 
then buy and sell their quota to other states within the block. He emphasises that all 
would be consensual, and on a regional or sub-regional basis, not a global one. States 
without large numbers of refugees at their borders may join in order to avoid absorbing 
large numbers of refugees in the future. Schuck (1997), like Hathaway and Neve (1997), 
presents his proposals as analogous to an insurance scheme where everyone will 
voluntarily agree to take part because of their own long-term self-interest. He also 
proposes that states within the block can sell quota-relief to countries outside the 
consensual block. Schuck notes that structural elements require that there be an 
‘agreement on the norms to share temporary and permanent protection needs in 
proportion to their “burden-bearing capacity”’. Perhaps Schuck uses the term ‘norms’ 
here in a similar way to Thielemann who, drawing on March and Olsen (1998: 7-10), 
views norms as expressing ‘appropriateness’ as opposed to the ‘logic of expected 
consequences’ where actors are strategic. If so, then a state would first need to hold an 
underlying belief about the appropriateness of absorbing refugees in proportion to their 
capacity before joining the scheme, in order for the scheme to function. However, if a 
country is acting according to the ‘norm’ of refugee protection because of the payments, 
actions are not directly taken as a result of ‘appropriateness’ but as a result of a cost-
benefit logic. Though states may hold a norm and only be able to act on it with 
payments, the direct reason is still the payments, following a cost-benefit logic. Schuck 
explains that a central refugee status would decide who is and who is not a refugee, the 
quota set, and exceptions for particular national groups. If a country does not respect 
human rights, they cannot join the block or accept refugees until they do. A central 
agency would assure fair selling and buying, though its main goal would be ensuring 
human rights protection of refugees. This is because states already have an interest in 
ensuring that transactions go through even if they do not have an interest in ensuring 
protection for refugees. Furthermore, small instalments, paid on the condition of humane 
protection of refugees, would ensure that refugee rights are in place over time. 
Anker et al. (1998) have critiqued the proposals of Schuck and Hathaway and Neve, 
arguing that Northern states will not be incentivised to provide cash to Southern states 
which provide greater protection, even if – and of this they are doubtful - there is money 
saved from the diminished need for individualised refugee status determination process 
in Northern states. Furthermore, even if money is transferred to Southern states, it may 
not be used for refugee protection. They also critique the moral soundness of the 
scheme, both because of its failure to protect refugees and because the plan creates a 
‘commodification’ of refugees. Others, who are concerned about respecting the 
preferences of refugees, have expanded and modified the basic models of refugee quota 
trading. Mortaga and Rapoport’s model (2010), for example, allows refugees to rank 
their preferences for country of destination.  
Even as his plan has been critiqued and modified over the last sixteen years, Schuck’s 
basic proposal remains particularly relevant for a discussion on the relationship between 
the EU and ENP in burden sharing, because his mechanism allows for a union of states to 
assign quotas voluntarily to each state within the union – such as the EU - yet also trade 
these quotas with states outside the union – such as ENP countries. Schuck’s proposal is 
especially relevant in the current discussions because there is arguably implicit and 
explicit quota trading between the EU and ENP states. The completely voluntary nature 
of his plan is also unique, and may be especially relevant in an EU that has yet to 
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establish binding agreements with ENP countries concerning refugee protection. Though 
many of the critiques that arise in this article are also applicable to other money transfer 
schemes, Schuck serves as an important focal point for the overall critique by showing 
the limits to a voluntary scheme. 
 
A CRITIQUE 
Incentives 
There are two main critiques regarding incentives. First, the perception of refugees as a 
public good – even if they are not – may diminish the incentive to stay in a quota trading 
insurance scheme. Second, even if refugee protection is not a public good or perceived 
as such, quota trading from above may still not function as predicted. Because both 
these critiques address the lack of incentive on the part of states, newer money transfer 
models that take into account refugee preferences, such as Mortaga and Rapoport 
2010), do not sufficiently address this weakness even if their work is more sensitive to 
the preferences of refugees. 
 
Refugee protection as a public good 
Anker et al. (1998) address the argument that incentives may be weak. They point out 
that Northern states may have no interest in buying the insurance proposed by 
Hathaway and Neve (1997) and Schuck (1997) because they do not perceive refugees 
as a threat that is unstoppable; current border control mechanisms may suffice. 
Additionally, because many EU states do not feel that they will be receiving a significant 
number of refugees in the near future, there is little reason to join an insurance scheme, 
though an iterative game can create an incentive to cooperate in case a significant 
number of refugees suddenly enter a country in the future (Noll 2003: 242). 
Building on this, one reason states may stop refugees reaching their borders is because 
refugee protection is viewed as at least partially a public good. If this is the case, even 
the prospect of a long ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod 1984: 126) in an iterative game 
(Noll 2003: 242) may not create an incentive to join an insurance scheme. Insurance 
works best if refugee protection is not a public good. If it was, individuals would have an 
incentive to free-ride (Thielemann, 2003b) and there would be no incentive to buy 
insurance voluntarily. Yet, refugee protection is currently partially a public good in the 
sense that, if one state deports a refugee to another state, the norm of refugee 
protection would largely be intact for all if the other state accepts the refugee, and the 
norm would be no less intact for all even if only one state is accepting all refugees. 
Czaika’s model, for this reason, includes protection in another country as benefiting all 
countries that place value on refugee protection in general. This would be true even if 
refugee protection does not, as Suhrke (1999) claims, contribute to the security of all. A 
good that is a partial public good may require a partially involuntary requirement as a 
basis for a voluntary insurance scheme. Health care serves as an example for this 
argument. Like refugee protection, society may believe that health ought to be a public 
good, making it so, to an extent. For example, if wealthy patients pay for a doctor, and a 
doctor cannot morally or legally turn away a poor patient who shows up at their private 
emergency room, then health care becomes partially a public good that is susceptible to 
free riding by those who could afford to pay for emergency care. This can lead to sub-
optimal health care for all. One reason that this does not happen is perhaps because the 
government requires all to pay taxes that contribute to both emergency and 
preventative medical care. The existence of government-funded hospitals, and 
government-funded health insurance, is the existence of required burden-sharing in 
health where all who work are required to pay for taxes that contribute to hospitals or 
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health insurance. Therefore, because the state, doctors, and society as a whole have 
largely decided that medical care should be a public good, one cannot opt-out in any 
given year from paying taxes which contribute to health care. 
Perhaps refugee protection is not functioning as envisioned in the 1951 Convention 
partly because there is a perception that some country in the world may provide 
protection, yet there is no required involuntary mechanism for subsidising the 
protection, as exists in health care. Even if refugee protection is only partly a public 
good, the perception should still have the impact of free-riding, just as private doctors in 
private clinics saving some lives for free may have some impact on the ability of a 
completely voluntary insurance scheme to function. This critique is distinct from the 
arguments put forth by those who argue that Northern states may not perceive large 
refugee inflows as a risk (Anker et al. 1998: 299) because they have mechanisms for 
stopping refugees from entering their borders. It is also distinct from Thielemann’s 
(2003b) comment that insurance schemes function best when all parties have the same 
risk perceptions. Rather, the critique here emphasises the impact of everyone perceiving 
refugee protection as something that ought to be a public good, and all behaving, some 
of the time, in a way that reinforces the perception of refugee protection as a public 
good, leading to free-riding. 
Carbon trading serves as an example of a policy that, while certainly not sufficient to 
protect against global warming, is relatively successful compared to refugee protection 
mechanisms in that companies are lowering their emission levels within the EU. Carbon 
trading within the EU includes a required carbon emissions limit; for a member state of 
the EU, and a company within the EU, emissions limits are not voluntary, they are 
required, even if the buying and selling of emissions limits is voluntary. Even if the 
original legislation needed to pass by consensus, today all countries must continue to 
follow this as a condition for their continuing membership in the EU as a whole. The 
trading and selling of emissions outside the EU is possible partly because it is not 
voluntary for companies within the EU. Firms would not have an interest in buying and 
selling if there were no legal requirements regarding emissions. This is solved by simply 
forcing countries to have emissions standards within the EU. Similarly, EU countries 
should be forced to accept certain refugee quotas in order for an insurance scheme to be 
effective. 
 
Pre-existing conditions 
A second critique relating to the health insurance analogy accepts that refugee 
protection may not entirely be a public good or even perceived as such. Indeed, 
healthcare is not always a public good, even if it ought to be, yet the existence of 
voluntary health insurance may increase the overall health and welfare of a society. 
Even so, private health insurance does not allow any individual to opt-in at any point and 
receive the same benefits at the same cost. Rather, individuals with pre-existing 
conditions pay a higher premium if they have these conditions at the point of buying 
insurance. The reason an individual may be incentivised to buy catastrophic health 
insurance during a time when they are healthy is partly because buying health insurance 
after or during a sickness will be significantly more expensive. 
In contrast, in Schuck’s plan states do not receive a higher quota or less money in return 
for absorbing refugees when they join the union only after they have more than their 
quotas of refugees. It is perfectly rational for a country that has no interest in absorbing 
refugees regardless of payments to join only when they have more than their quota, 
thus avoiding a situation where they must accept the minimum quota or pay another 
country. Yet, if all acted this way, there may be no country to which to sell the extra 
quotas. This is not possible in a completely private sector health insurance scheme, 
because a private health insurance company demands higher premiums for anyone with 
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pre-existing conditions, thus incentivising individuals to join before they are sick. The 
reason private health insurance schemes can maximise their profits through such 
premiums for pre-existing conditions is because they are, in essence, competing against 
sickness without treatment. While Schuck creates a market mechanism for the trading of 
quotas, the cost of not joining the scheme does not fall on states, but on refugees. For 
this reason, it is unlikely that states will act as citizens in a health insurance scheme. 
Therefore, even if refugee protection is not a public good and never will be, Schuck’s 
quota trading plan – and arguably other completely voluntary insurance burden sharing 
plans (Hathaway and Neve 1997) - may not create the necessary incentives for states to 
join. 
 
Cheating the system and inhumane conditions 
Even if states appear to be incentivised to accept payments for refugee protection or are 
willing to pay other states for refugee protection, it is not clear that refugees are actually 
being protected within these states. The problem of human rights abuses within EU 
states and within ENP states is related to current burden-sharing mechanisms. As noted 
above, outsourcing of asylum processing is a method of preventing new refugees from 
entering the EU, leaving them in ENP countries. Protected Entry Procedures often come 
at the expense of spontaneous refugees (Noll et al. 2002) who may be fleeing a country 
that is not offering true asylum in the form of protection from human rights abuses, 
either because they are at risk of deportation to another country that abuses human 
rights or because they are abused within the host country. Schuck recognises this 
current problem and suggests small instalments, paid on condition of humane protection 
of refugees, to ensure that refugee rights are in place. The UNHCR would ensure that 
conditions are following those required in international law. There are four central 
critiques related to this plan. 
Firstly, under the status quo, the UNHCR is not always fulfilling this role, especially in 
states that claim not to have the capacity to provide the conditions demanded in the 
1951 Convention. Even when EU states do agree not to deport refugees – as when the 
agreement between Spain and Morocco fell through – this is partially possible because 
there are ways to prevent future spontaneous refugees from arriving, as shown with 
Denmark limiting entrance to Bosnians. If countries can already deport refugees back to 
first countries, without taking responsibility for the conditions refugees face in these first 
countries, and if countries can already prevent entrance, it is unclear why it would be in 
the interests of EU countries to pay first ENP countries to accept refugees. Even if they 
are willing to pay – as Morocco demanded of Spain – it is unclear why EU countries have 
an interest in ensuring that humane conditions are met. 
Secondly, the market-orientated plan, within the context of the EU and ENP countries, 
can lead to even more human rights abuses if countries that currently abuse refugees 
join the trading system and now also have a financial incentive to keep refugees within 
their borders, by force if necessary. Or, alternatively, if the abusing country does not 
want to pay the price of more refugees in return for funds, it can illegally deport 
refugees back to their country of origin, accepting more refugees, and counting both the 
deported and newly arrived as part of the overall number in their country. Considering 
that Egypt (USCRI 2009) and Israel (European Commission 2010) both ENP countries, 
have been known secretly to deport recognised refugees back to Sudan, this is a 
possibility that must be taken into account. 
Thirdly, the instalment scheme has limited power to address these problems. Any 
instalment paid by one country to another is one more reason for this paying country not 
to accept these refugees, because money has already been given. More importantly, 
there is no way of ensuring that the time it takes to pay all instalments stretches out 
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over the time period that the country of asylum must provide protection to the refugees. 
If refugees come from a country of origin that cannot be returned to for a period longer 
than the period for completing the payment of instalments, then the country of asylum 
can begin deporting refugees after all the instalments have been paid. This can be seen 
today. The UNHCR, whose funds come partly from EU states, pays developing states, 
including ENP countries, funds to cover the costs of accepting refugees. In a way, this is 
a type of instalment scheme, in that the UNHCR can stop the funds if initial refugees are 
abused. However, this did not happen on the ground in Egypt, where the Egyptian 
government continued to receive funds from the UNHCR for refugees accepted, up until 
over one hundred refugees were killed in front of the UNHCR offices by Egyptian security 
forces in Cairo in 2005 (Smrkolj 2010). Even after this event, the UNHCR continued to 
settle asylum-seekers inside Egypt, despite the fact that this settlement scheme was, 
according to many, the equivalent to refoulement (Fouda 2007: 512), due to the risks of 
staying in Egypt. 
Finally, measuring the level of abuse is especially difficult. Entering a host country and 
asking if refugees are given their rights can be difficult if freedom of speech is limited 
within the country, or if refugees in particular are afraid to release information on their 
true conditions. For example, in Israel, an ENP country, Sudanese refugee children could 
not register in local public schools in Eilat. In interviews, when asked why they did not 
publicise this, or demand their rights to education, they responded that ‘we do not want 
to have any problems, or be kicked out of the town’.1 The fear that inhumane conditions 
create can also lead to fear of discussing such conditions. The worse the conditions, the 
more difficult it may be to assess those conditions. 
Transparency in the process for Refugee Status Determination (RSD) is equally 
problematic. Schuck acknowledges that his plan would necessitate transparency of 
method for establishing who is and is not a refugee and in the allocation procedure and 
criteria for allocating quotas. However, within the EU, financial transparency arguably 
evolved through a gradual process (Cini 2008: 751). Once the policy passed, the 
commitment to the publication of the EU’s Structural Funds was made permanent and 
countries could not simply opt out, as they could when the publication of the use of 
funds was done though national laws. Without ensuring this transparency, refugees’ lives 
will be put at risk within countries that, under refugee quota trading, are now given a 
financial incentive to keep refugees within their borders. 
 
Status quo bias and present-biased preferences 
The arguments pertaining to incentives and cheating assume that the agents involved 
are rational. Present-bias preferences may play a role in states’ actions, meaning they 
act in a way that is perhaps distinct from both a normative and cost-benefit logic. These 
biases may also assist in explaining why coordination has failed in the past and why EU 
states are not always prepared to provide funds to ENP states, just as Northern states 
are hesitant to provide sufficient funds to Southern states (Anker et al. 1998). 
This bias has been addressed in both philosophy, when attempting to determine moral 
reasoning, such as Parfit who calls this ‘the bias towards the near’ (Parfit 2011: 46), and 
in behavioural economics, where status quo bias in human behaviour has been found to 
exist through controlled studies of human subjects. Schuck (1997) and others who 
propose quota trading (Mortaga and Rapoport 2010) and money transfers (Hathaway 
and Neve 1997) do not take into account the possibility of this non-normative and non-
rational bias. There is evidence that this bias exists. Immediate deportations, before the 
public or human rights groups are aware that the refugee has made it to the country, 
are common by border patrols which do not have the resources or expertise to decide if 
an individual is a true refugee (Mertus 1998). There may be a bias for action to keep the 
status quo and deport, but once refugees have stayed in the country for a particular 
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time, then the status quo changes to be one where refugees are now in the country, and 
inaction may be more common. International law may also create a status quo bias. Noll 
(2003), for example, suggests that international law creates certain risks for states that 
deport refugees within their borders, in contrast to extra-territorial prevention of refugee 
entrance which ‘costs’ less in the form of legal repercussions. 
Taking status quo into account, let us assume two countries, A and B, have the same 
level of normative belief in refugee protection and the same resources. However, country 
A has refugees directly crossing their border, and country B does not. Country A will 
deport as many refugees as it can at the border today, because of status quo bias. 
Country A will also not deport some refugees who manage to somehow stay in the 
country, also because of status quo bias because the status quo is now that there are 
refugees in the country. Country A has accepted exactly their quota. Country B is willing 
to pay country A money not to deport any new refugees in the future, though country B 
is far enough away to not necessarily be faced with the deportees from A. 
Taking into account status quo bias, even if country A values refugee protection, the cost 
of accepting refugees it wants to deport today is both the cost of changing the status 
quo and the general resources needed to accept refugees. Both A and B will gain the 
normative value of protecting refugees, though B has none of these costs. Even if 
country B also fears these refugees will flee to country B, and its status quo bias for 
preventing new refugees will encourage it to pay country A to keep refugees, this is a 
more distant ‘threat’, and it is statistically a lesser threat compared to that faced by 
country A. In a sense, country B may be influenced by ‘present-biased preferences’ 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). That is to say, avoiding future losses from future new 
refugees for country B will not translate into as high a monetary value as country A’s 
current losses from the current new refugees. 
If the mental mechanism for present-biased preferences is that ‘concrete mental 
representation’ seems more valuable than theoretical rewards (Loewenstein 1996), then 
country A will expect to get a concrete mental representation reward in return for a 
concrete mental representation of accepting refugees. Country B is expected, in Schuck’s 
model, to pay concrete mental representations in the form of funds for a more 
theoretically uncertain threat of future refugees. Country B will presumably be willing to 
pay less than what country A demands, because country B is gaining something 
theoretical only, while country A is paying the cost of the more concrete mental 
representation of allowing refugees to cross their borders or stay within their borders 
even though they have just arrived. If country B will not pay country A enough, no 
transaction will occur, and country A will illegally deport even if both A and B believe that 
deportation is normatively wrong on the same level. 
Another possibility is that countries may be overpaid to keep refugees who have already 
lived in the country for long enough to become the status quo in status quo bias. These 
are the refugees who managed to stay in country A despite country A deporting some 
refugees. This, presumably, is less problematic, as refugees will still not be deported. 
However, more worryingly, citizens in country A may have exaggerated perceptions of 
the number of refugees within their country who have recently been absorbed compared 
to the number of refugees that citizens in country B perceive that country A has 
absorbed. Country A will, for this reason as well, demand far more money than country 
B is willing to provide in return for accepting more refugees. One can see today that 
many citizens have exaggerated perceptions of the percentage of refugees that they 
have provided protection to, perhaps a type of concrete mental representation 
influencing those perceptions. A British 2003 poll found that, on average, British people 
‘estimated that Britain had 23 per cent of the world’s refugees’ rather than the actual 2 
per cent at the time of the poll (ICAR 2003). States with refugees may exaggerate the 
value they are giving to alleviate the world ‘burden’, making the cost they perceive as 
higher than the cost that other states perceive. 
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However, if a choice is presented as if it is the status quo, then perhaps the alternative 
will be accepted (Kahneman et al. 1991). If citizens view the quota requirement as the 
status quo, as opposed to a change from the current number of refugees accepted, then 
a quota system could encourage refugee hosting in countries that currently accept less 
than the quota to be agreed upon. However, any number above the quota may be 
viewed as changing the status quo, leading to illegal deportations of those who have 
managed to settle in the country, and who, today, may have been given some sort of 
protection. This could mean that refugees who arrive after a quota is filled would be put 
at greater risk if the trading mechanism fails. 
 
Ethical Critique 
If the plan puts refugees at great risk, Anker et al. (1998) point out, it is questionable on 
moral grounds. They also provide an argument for why the plan itself is not moral, 
irrespective of its ability to protect refugees (1998: 294). They claim that refugee quota 
trading creates ‘commodification’ of refugees. In response to this, one could just as well 
argue that the protection is the commodity traded, rather than the refugees, just as in a 
hospital it is the treatment which is the commodity, not the patient. Smith provides a 
slightly different ethical argument, comparing refugee quota trading to parents paying 
mercenaries to avoid their children being drafted into the military (Smith 2004: 137). 
Outsourcing one’s moral obligations can create divides in society based on wealth and 
forcing those with fewer means to take the greatest risks. As distinct from Anker et al., 
one could understand Smith’s argument as showing that refugee quota trading is the 
commodification of moral obligations which may be immoral. 
This article attempts to show that refugee quota trading is even worse than the hiring of 
mercenaries and the outsourcing of one’s moral obligations. With mercenaries, those 
fighting are being paid money for risk taking, and not only to fulfil a moral obligation. 
With refugee quota trading, the refugees are not being paid to take the risk – the 
accepting state is being paid, regardless of its history with the treatment of refugees. 
However, this still does not signify that refugees are a commodity if the payments to 
states are for their own protection. A purely utilitarian argument may hold that this is 
just if more refugees will be saved. A moral critique of the utilitarian nature of the plan 
must therefore question the morality of the plan even if more refugees are saved in this 
plan. To do this, a new critique is presented which explores the nature of reward and 
punishment. 
Quota trading, in essence, awards countries for ‘voluntarily’ accepting refugees, when 
many of these refugees should, under the current policy, be able to access asylum 
without the receiving countries being rewarded for providing asylum. With refugee 
quota-trading, the final country to receive refugees would be rewarded for not breaking 
what is currently the law, rather than rewarded for receiving more refugees than is 
required under the law. Today, any country that rejects refugees automatically passes 
the buck to another country to accept the burden and this next country, in turn, also has 
the legal obligation to accept the refugees, not the voluntary responsibility. Schuck is 
legitimising non-refoulement as a voluntary action when states receive more than their 
quota, because it is something that is dependent on payment from another country, 
rather than punished when not followed. If non-refoulement was required in his plan, 
states receiving more than their quota as a result of other states rejecting refugees 
could not demand that another state pay it for absorbing refugees. It would need to 
absorb the refugees, both morally and legally, if every other country would deport the 
refugees to their country of origin. 
While a deeper philosophical analysis is beyond the scope of this article, an example 
from within a country may demonstrate why quota trading may be intuitively unethical 
even if more refugees are protected. Within countries, high murder rates could arguably 
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justify a type of ‘murder quota-trading’ mechanism: all citizens who wished to murder 
would need a specified large number of points; each citizen is given one point upon 
birth, and citizens can buy and sell points. Any citizen that commits murder without the 
necessary points would have their point/s revoked, be imprisoned and unable to take 
part in the murder-quota trading mechanism in the future. Prison sentences would be 
shorter than today, as there already exists a positive incentive not to murder in order to 
sell one’s points either directly or indirectly (through traders) to others who did wish to 
murder. The number of points needed to murder would result in a lower number of 
murders compared to the number of murders hitherto occurring. Such a mechanism 
could, potentially, lower murder rates – the incentive not to murder to sell points might 
be cheaper to organise compared to lengthy prison sentences and giving the option only 
to murder when one bought sufficient points would perhaps encourage potential 
murderers to wait, think twice, and kill sparingly in return for no prison sentence at all.  
Most would view this as morally wrong. It is not wrong only because there may be 
practical limitations to such a mechanism. The ethical limitations surely dwarf any 
technical limitations. An action which is seen as unquestionably wrong, and which no 
human being should take, is being rewarded simply for not being taken. Similarly, 
refugee quota trading may be wrong because it rewards countries for fulfilling an 
obligation that ought to be punished if transgressed. 
This is not to argue that, today, countries are not transgressing the principles of the 
1951 Convention and 1967 protocol. The EU does not allow ‘country shopping’ between 
EU countries and between ENP and EU countries, even when many refugees are not 
shopping but fleeing. They may be fleeing an ENP country to Europe, out of fear that the 
ENP country will deport them back to their country of origin, or provide such inhumane 
conditions that they are arguably refugees of the ENP country, such as the condition for 
Sudanese refugees in Egypt in 2005 (Smrkolj 2010). They may be fleeing from one EU 
country to another. Darfur refugees who were threatened with deportation from the 
United Kingdom (Gilmore 2007), an EU member, could arguably qualify for genuine 
asylum in another EU country, without being blamed for ‘shopping’. 
If this is the current state of refugee protection, then perhaps the moral stance should 
be stated as such: even if it is morally better to punish a country for committing a crime 
than to reward a country for not committing a crime, this is only true if the same 
amount of lives is saved in both scenarios. At the very least, it is still better to save 
more lives through a mechanism that rewards countries for not committing the crime of 
illegal deportation than to spare lives through a mechanism that only punishes. 
However, a refugee quota trading mechanism must show that ensuring protection for 
refugees in countries which receive a reward for taking more than their quota will 
somehow be easier than ensuring protection for refugees in countries which are 
receiving a punishment for illegal deportations. The proponents of refugee quota trading 
have failed to establish this. Even if they had, there are still doubts as to the morality of 
the policy, just as murder quota trading would be unacceptable to many even under 
conditions where murder rates would go down as a result of the plan. 
Furthermore, the problem with refugee quota trading is not necessarily that it is 
utilitarian at all, in the philosophical sense, as Anker et al. (1998) claim. The act of 
commodifying refugees – and certainly the psychological damage for refugees who feel 
they are being commodified – could very well be a ‘bad’ that a utilitarian would wish to 
avoid. In addition, even if one is only concerned with utilitarian social welfare, the reason 
punishment is used for heinous crimes is perhaps for reasons that are also utilitarian 
from the perspective of social welfare. If a punishment feels psychologically worse than 
the lack of a reward, perhaps due to loss-aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), then 
a reward mechanism may be less effective. This argument is therefore potentially 
compatible with a range of philosophical perspectives and raises doubts as to the 
morality of an EU Refugee Fund that is used as an incentive payment to states to accept 
refugees. 
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This logic could be applicable to the case of EU-ENP relations in the sphere of refugee 
protection. Today, the EU often threatens to demote trade relations with countries that 
have poor records in human rights, including in the areas of illegal deportation of 
refugees. The ENP country reports have detailed information about the conditions and 
policy with regards to refugees and, at least officially, claim to build relations partially 
according to these and other human rights conditions (COM [2004] 373). There is a case 
to be made for demoting relations, without rewarding compliance with international 
refugee law, in order to uphold certain moral principles that may be distinct from 
optimising social welfare from a utilitarian perspective, or which may be consistent with 
utilitarian perspectives that take into account non-rational biases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article set out to show how the ability to deport ultimately makes any insurance 
plan incomparable to successful catastrophic health insurance schemes. States can opt 
in and out of a scheme strategically and the element of bias towards the present skews 
the ability for a purely rational incentive mechanism to encourage refugee absorption. 
Most importantly, this article suggested that a moral argument must show why the 
trading of refugee quotas may not be ethically sound even if more lives are saved, and 
this idea can be applied to current relations between EU and ENP countries. The failed 
agreements between Spain and Morocco, the failure of Bosnians to receive protection in 
Denmark, and the failure of the EU to absorb more refugees in proportion to states’ GNP, 
are not only examples of failures of rational states to cooperate. They may have been a 
failure on the part of the EU to create the type of mechanism that takes into account the 
way rational and irrational states act in a world where deportation is still a possibility, 
and the way rational and irrational states ought to act in an EU that has yet to fulfil its 
international obligations set forth in 1951 and 1967. 
These theoretical ideas could perhaps be better tested using a stronger, more complex 
theoretical analysis seen in the work of Noll (2003), Facchini et al. (2006), Czaika 
(2009), and Mortaga and Rapoport (2010). The analysis could also be greatly enhanced 
by testing the ideas against a broader array of policies and data, as done by Thielemann 
(2003a) within the context of the EU. The limited data on unauthorised deportations and 
abuses in countries with limited human rights may create challenges for testing the ideas 
against reality, yet it is possible to do so with extensive field work. 
One may argue that, even when the idea of quota trading appears morally questionable, 
it still may appear more ethically sound compared to today’s unequal distribution of 
contributions towards refugee protection. Perhaps it is not enough to show that quota 
trading is wrong, but that it is more wrong than the current policies. Nonetheless, there 
are other ways in which refugees can be protected through cash transfers, such as 
offering more funds to private NGOs and charities, or directly to refugees, rather than to 
host countries in return for greater asylum processing and refugee protection. Assuming 
the idea of refugee quota trading would be as difficult to implement as other less morally 
questionable forms of refugee protection and assistance, then quota trading should play 
no or only a limited role in the shaping of EU and ENP policies towards refugees. There 
may still be a place for cash transfers, but it must be done in a way that makes rational 
and moral sense. 
***
                                                 
1
 Interview with Adam, September 12, 2009 in Eilat, Israel. Interviews were conducted with eight refugees on 
September 12th 2009 in two community centres. 
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